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NINETEENTH .. CENTURY PATTERNS 
OF RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT 
ON THE GREAT PLAINS 
RUSSELL S. KIRBY 
he North American Great Plains experienced 
rapid settlement and economic growth from 
1870 to 1914. The advance of settlement and 
the development of local economy, while 
generally contiguous, were by no means uni-
form. Soil conditions, underground water 
supplies, the network of rivers and streams, 
rainfall, and growing season are all attributes 
of the physical environment that vary across 
the plains both longitudinally and latitudinally. 
In addition, the extent of effective settlement 
in the Mississippi River valley, the natural 
starting point for westward expansion onto the 
plains, varied considerably in 1865. Given these 
economic and environmental preconditions, it 
is not surprising that settlement on the Great 
Plains after 1870 varied in timing and degree. 
Although the physical geography of the area 
must be taken into account, the differences 
in the timing and amount of economic develop-
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ment of the region were largely due to the 
uneven expansion of the railroad network 
after 1870. Some areas were heavily overen-
dowed with railroad facilities, while others 
received barely adequate, or even niggardly, 
treatment at the hands of railroad businessmen 
and entrepreneurs. The construction and 
operation of railroads on the plains were 
governed in part by strategic, managerial, 
financial, and institutional forces that produced 
a transport system with no necessary relation-
ship to the contemporary or potential eco-
nomic landscape of the Canadian and American 
Great Plains. 
This article examines the process of corpor-
ate railroad decision making in the larger con-
text of investments, developmental strategies, 
and operational considerations, and explores 
the spatial evolution of four major railroad 
systems from their origins to 1915. These 
railroads, two American and two Canadian, 
demonstrate various strategies of system 
development. Generalizations drawn from a 
brief historical overview, combined with 
insights from other analyses of entrepreneurial 
and business practices of nineteenth-century 
railroads and their leaders, suggest a hypothet-
ical sequence of railroad system development 
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at the level of the corporation in nineteenth-
century North America. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Within the context of railroad systems, from 
both an investment and an operational point 
of view, several concepts and terms have been 
developed by business and economic historians 
to facilitate the understanding of investor and 
corporate decision making. As these ideas will 
be applied to the development of the four 
Great Plains railroads considered here, some 
brief definitions are warranted. 
First, in order to understand the investment 
strategies pursued by individual capitalists and 
entrepreneurs, it is useful to differentiate, as 
Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple have 
done, between developmental and opportunis-
tic investments and investment strategies in the 
nineteenth-century railroad business. A devel-
opmental investment strategy is one in which 
an 'investor looks to long-term growth in a 
booming region for the economic rewards 
from capital investment. Opportunistic invest-
ments, on the other hand, have "relatively 
shorter time horizons, the context of which 
was not so much future income growth as the 
securing of profits from available markets-
whether for goods, for railroad services, or for 
stocks and bonds.,,1 
There is a continuum from developmental 
to opportunistic investment, and while any 
individual's current motives can be placed 
somewhere along this continuum, those mo-
tives, or the criteria for subsequent investment 
decisions, could easily change with time or with 
changes in other financial and economic factors 
not necessarily bearing directly on railroading. 
Local merchants and farmers committed their 
capital to early local railroad companies as a 
means of increasing their business profits. Dis-
tant investors often purchased railroad bonds 
and debentures with a view to stable, long-term 
developmental profits. By the late nineteenth 
century, many railroads had come under the 
control of strictly financial, large-scale capitalist 
interests. Often located at some distance from 
their railroads, financiers used their properties 
for much broader strategic purposes, manipu-
lating the securities, freight rates, connections, 
and through routes almost at will. As often as 
opportunistic profits were made-through fi-
nancial wizardry, shady construction contracts, 
or dealings in railroad lands-great fortunes 
disappeared overnight in the aftermath of bank 
failures, overextension, or bankruptcy and 
receivership. 
Except in virgin railroad territories, it is 
difficult to characterize most late nineteenth-
century railroad investments as anything but 
opportunistic. If one makes a conceptual leap 
from the level of the investor to that of the 
company, however, this is not so. While John-
son and Supple are careful to apply their analy-
sis only to investors, however wealthy or influ-
ential they may have been, it seems appropriate 
to discuss the investment, operating, and new 
construction decisions of nineteenth-century 
railroad corporations in the same terms. Thus, 
an opportunistic managerial strategy might 
involve the sale of railroad assets, competitive 
pricing policies on freight or passengers, or the 
rapid construction or acquisition of railroad 
lines in direct competition with one or more 
rival companies. Developmental corporate stra-
tegies would include controlled systems growth 
and the husbanding of nonrail assets such as 
agricultural lands and mineral or forest re-
sources for the long-term prosperity of the 
railroad. Viewed from a broad, system-wide 
perspective, it would be conceivable for a given 
railroad to engage in a purely or largely oppor-
tunistic strategy in one part of its system while 
simultaneously developing the future potential 
of its business in another portion of its net-
work. Indeed, the larger the system, the more 
likely that this combination of strategies would 
exist. 
Railroad historians have also identified two 
types of system development. The major devel-
opment strategy of many nineteenth-century 
railroads was the territorial development of a 
near monopoly on freight and passenger traffic 
in a particular district. Indeed, the concept of a 
"natural" territory appears again and again in 
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the documents left by important figures in the 
railroad industry of the late nineteenth and 
I . h . 2 I . ear y twentlet centunes. n contrast to tern-
torial development, the term interterritorial 
competition describes the sequence of events 
that often ensued when the lines of one road 
invaded the natural, or integral, territory of 
another railroad. Interterritorial competition 
could take many forms, including physical con-
struction of mileage in direct competition with 
another firm, preferential agreements with 
complementary systems in competition with 
one another, mergers, consolidations, and 
cutthroat price wars. Just as developmental 
and opportunistic investment or management 
strategies are pure forms that seldom exist in 
practice, territorial development or interterri-
torial competition rarely characterizes the 
strategy of a single railroad over its entire net-
work at any given time.3 
To these two ideal types of territorial stra-
tegy, I would add a third. The concept of 
city-hinterland symbiosis is useful in describing 
the nexus of mutually reinforcing economic 
ties between a railroad line and its initial 
terminus. This type of development strategy 
was pursued by early or small railroad com-
panies that identified their economic interests 
closely with those of the business community 
they served. 
Finally, the concepts of local and through 
traffic and routes are very important in under-
standing corporate railroad system development 
in the nineteenth century on the Great Plains. 
Local traffic refers to business that originates 
or terminates at a local station on a railroad's 
line. Through traffic requires some transfer or 
connection, with the same carrier or with an-
other carrier. Through routes are direct lines 
between pairs of major cities, with no change 
of cars required. On any given journey, a pas-
senger might be deemed local traffic from, say, 
a village station to Kansas City, but a through 
passenger from Kansas City to Chicago on 
another line. A traveler might have purchased a 
through fare for the entire journey, but the 
type of traffic classified by each road could 
differ. The distinction is important, because 
through passengers and freight traversing a line 
between major cities often paid a lower fare per 
mile or unit weight than local traffic, which 
paid a premium fare for transportation pur-
chased in what was often a nearly monopolized 
marketplace. 
Bearing in mind these three sets of concepts-
opportunistic and developmental investments 
and managerial strategies; territorial develop-
ment, interterritorial competition, and city-
hinterland symbiosis; and local versus through 
traffic and routes-let us now examine the 
evolution of four major Great Plains railroad 
systems from their origins to 1915. 
GREAT PLAINS CASE STUDIES 
The lines chosen for study include two 
American railroads, the Chicago, Burlington, 
and Quincy and the Atchison, Topeka, and 
Santa Fe, and two Canadian railways, the 
Canadian Pacific and the Canadian Northern. 
All four grew by 1914 into major common 
carriers on the Great Plains. Although the 
railroads originated in slightly different circum-
stances, a review of their corporate histories 
and systems evolution suggests a number of 
parallels and some differences in their sequen-
tial development. The maps in Figures 1 and 2 
show the general extent of each network in 
1915. Major trunks and branches have been 
classified according to the probable develop-
ment strategy under which each line was built 
or acquired by each company. These system 
maps should be examined in conjunction with 
the following overviews of the growth of each 
railroad. 
THE BURLINGTON SYSTEM 
The Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Rail-
road (hereafter referred to as the Burlington) 
had its origins in several short railroads in cen-
tral Illinois that were largely financed locally. 
The system as it was first integrated in the mid-
1850s consisted of a main line from Chicago to 
Galesburg with two branches to the Mississippi 
River at Burlington, Iowa, and Quincy, Illinois. 
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FIG. 1. The evolution of the Burlington and the Canadian Northern to 1915. 
Prior to the Civil War, the Burlington served as 
a symbiotic link between the rising commercial 
metropolis of Chicago and the rich agricultural 
lands of north and central Illinois (Fig. 1). 
The Boston capitalists who gained control 
of the Burlington before the Civil War, and 
maintained control of the fIrm's capital stock 
for a considerable period of time, pursued a 
generally developmental growth strategy. De-
spite numerous opportunities for profIt taking, 
through manipulation of construction contracts 
or speculation in the land grants awarded to the 
company or to its subsidiaries, there is little 
evidence of opportunism in the development of 
the Burlington system during its formative 
years. 4 
Following the Civil War, the Burlington 
rapidly expanded westward into a burgeoning 
but highly competitive market for the trans-
continental trade brought to the Missouri River 
valley over the Union PacifIc, and for the agri-
cultural produce and supply trade of Iowa and 
the eastern Great Plains. In entering this 
market, the company began to engage in inter-
territorial competition. 
An early strategy of controlling the Bur-
lington and Missouri River Railroad enabled 
the Burlington to participate in the famous 
Iowa Pool of the 1870s as a strong partner. 
The Council Bluffs-Chicago route became a 
western trunk line, providing extensive and 
profItable through traffic for the system. The 
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Burlington also attempted to garner a larger 
share of local traffic in north-central Illinois 
by acquiring strategically located but weaker 
lines. By 1875 the railroad had also built a 
line, nominally under its control, to Kearney, 
Nebraska, on the platte River, in an attempt 
to command an even larger share of the trans-
continental traffic to Chicago. This strategic 
construction set off a round of securities manipu-
lation, intrigue, and interterritorial competition 
for the Burlington line. 5 
By 1900 the Burlington system could boast 
of several through routes not present in 1875. 
These provided direct connections between 
Chicago and Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Saint 
Louis, Kansas City, and Denver, as well as be-
tween important city pairs including Denver-
Kansas City, Kansas City-Saint Louis, and Saint 
Louis-Minneapolis. In each case, these through 
routes were acquired or constructed in order to 
gain a stronger position in the through traffic 
markets of the Great Plains and the Middle 
West. Once each line was built or consolidated 
into the system, its primary function was the 
long-distance movement of commodities and 
passengers. The railroad did what it could to 
develop local traffic along these routes, but the 
important role of each in interterritorial com-
petition placed the development oflocal traffic 
in a secondary position in the strategy of the 
system's managers. 
Western branches to Billings and Cheyenne 
provided connections with transcontinental 
roads much farther west than did the Burling-
ton's competitors. These lines also served to 
develop the ranching industry and the natural 
resources of the eastern Rockies and the north-
ern Great Plains. Local traffic did playa role in 
the strategic location of these western routes, as 
did the prospect of a long haul of commodities 
to Chicago or to other distant cities on the Bur-
lington line. 
The essential outlines of the Burlington rail 
network were in place by 1900. Although addi-
tional mileage was added, the system gained 
access to no major new markets in the period 
from 1900 to 1915. Most new lines were 
branches and feeders that reinforced the 
already existing system in Nebraska, Iowa, and 
northern Illinois. Work was proceeding on a 
new line into north-central Wyoming, but no 
other interterritorial construction took place. 6 
Thus the Burlington had its origins as a 
western road in symbiosis with the city of chi-
cago and its growing hinterland in north-central 
Illinois. After the Civil War, the railroad devel-
oped local territories in Illinois, Iowa, and 
Nebraska. Partly as a response to interterritorial 
competition, but also to gain longer haul traffic 
with its increased revenues, the Burlington de-
veloped a number of through routes after 1875 
and built up natural territories of monopolized 
local traffic on the prairies and eastern Great 
Plains. 
THE CANADIAN NORTHERN SYSTEM 
The Canadian Northern Railway had its 
origins in several local lines north and north-
west of Winnipeg. These lines were symbiotic 
links designed to develop the agricultural 
resources of Manitoba and to stimulate the 
local economy of the city of Winnipeg. Under 
the aggressive leadership of William MacKenzie 
and Donald Mann, the Canadian Northern 
established a network of railroad lines in Mani-
toba from its original nucleus (Fig. 1).7 
At first, the Canadian Northern lines were 
built largely with provincial aid in the form of 
bond guarantees. Some of the railway lines 
preceding the Canadian Northern had federal 
subsidies or land grants associated with their 
charters. The strategy of the Canadian Northern 
principals was to finance the construction of 
new territorial development with provincial 
bond guarantees and to carry the operating 
expenses of these lines initially on the profits 
generated on existing lines in more prosperous, 
longer-settled agricultural districts. New con-
struction was built to minimum specifications 
and tracks were upgraded as traffic warranted. 
The Canadian Northern became the line of 
choice for many prairie farmers, in part because 
the railway agreed to rates set by the provin-
cial government at levels below those prevailing 
on the Canadian Pacific Railway, the only 
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major competitor. The Canadian Pacific had its 
long transcontinental spine to subsidize and 
maintain, while the Canadian Northern had 
only its prairie network and could afford to 
move traffic profitably at lower rates. 
The Canadian Northern proprietors fi-
nanced most of their original system through 
government subsidies and debt securities, re-
taining the entire capital stock of the company 
for most of its history. Only during the troubled 
years after 1912 did any equity securities leave 
their grasp, and these went to the dominion 
government in exchange for additional sub-
sidies. 
The quest for through traffic initially led 
the railway to consider interterritorial competi-
tion. With no lines to the East, the Canadian 
Northern got only a short haul on its local 
traffic to Winnipeg or to connections at the 
international border. The only alternative was 
to turn over traffic to the Canadian Pacific 
even closer to the point of origination. The 
Canadian Northern proprietors therefore deter-
mined to build to Port Arthur on Lake Su-
perior. The ability of the company to control 
the grain traffic of the Prairie Provinces with 
this extension eastward was hampered only by 
the inadequacy of its rolling stock at peak 
seasons. Eventually it became clear that the 
road would have to develop its own tracks 
both to eastern urban centers and to the 
Pacific. Unfortunately for the people of Can-
ada in the future, negotiations either to merge 
the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk, 
or to operate the Canadian Pacific's line north 
of Lake Superior jointly for all three trans-
continental systems, fell through. The Canadian 
Northern received dominion land-grant and 
cash subsidies, but the railway became over-
extended in the course of completing its 
transcontinental route. 
After 1900 the Canadian Northern and the 
Canadian Pacific were the major rivals engaged 
in interterritorial competition on the prairies. 
While the two railroads extensively overbuilt 
the railroad network of the region, each was 
able to claim substantial districts as territorial 
preserves. For through traffic from the Rocky 
Mountain front to the lakehead, competition 
was fierce indeed. Maximum rates were set by 
the dominion agency controlling railway rates, 
leaving a ceiling on transportation costs. At 
peak harvest season, however, the two com-
panies must have moved traffic at cost or very 
little above. As in the case of the Burlington, 
local traffic supported the growth of the sys-
tem as a whole and offset the cost of unprofit-
able or recently constructed segments. 
The economic climate in the years preceding 
the outbreak of World War I, and the changed 
financial situation and immigration patterns 
that ensued during the war, spelled the end for 
the Canadian Northern. Seriously overextended, 
the line might have survived had the economic 
growth of the prairies continued unabated. In 
1918, control of the Canadian Northern came 
into the hands of the dominion government. 
Today it forms the bulk of the western system 
of Canadian National Railway. The firm was 
not killed by its competitors, despite the stren-
uous nature of interterritorial competition on 
the prairies after 1900. 
THE SANTA FE SYSTEM 
The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Rail-
road (hereafter referred to as the Santa Fe) 
grew out of the interurban rivalry among the 
Missouri River towns of Atchison, Saint Joseph, 
Leavenworth, and Kansas City for the com-
merce of Kansas and the West. 8 The Santa Fe 
had its origins as a locally controlled, symbiotic 
link extending westward from Topeka toward 
the Kansas-Colorado state line, with connec-
tions via the Kansas Pacific to Atchison. Early 
recognizing its need for direct connections with 
midwestern trunk lines to the East, the Santa 
Fe built its own line to the Missouri River at 
Atchison. By 1872, this young, rapidly growing 
road had completed the skeleton of its network 
across the southern half of Kansas and had 
earned its congressionally mandated land grant 
(Fig. 2).9 
Santa Fe managers dreamed of building a 
transcontinental railroad along the old 35th 
parallel route. 10 This long-term objective 
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FIG. 2. The evolution of the Santa Fe and the Canadian Pacific to 1915. 
required large investments in the secuntIes of 
the railroad and the development of extensive, 
profitable local traffic along the existing rail 
network. Considerable through traffic could 
be anticipated only upon the completion of 
the transcontinental road. After 1872, there-
fore, the Santa Fe followed an aggressive policy 
of territorial development in Kansas, building 
some new branches and feeders while acquiring 
others. Although not a true monopoly in south-
ern Kansas, the Santa Fe had become the domi-
nant railroad in the area by 1875. 
During this period, the Santa Fe pursued a 
rapid territorial growth policy in extending its 
line first to Pueblo, Colorado, and later south 
from La Junta through New Mexico and into 
El Paso. By 1885 the Santa Fe was embroiled 
in an interterritorial struggle with both the 
Southern Pacific and the Denver and Rio 
Grande. The extensive route development that 
took place after 1872 would have been impos-
sible without the profits generated from local 
traffic in the natural, or integral, territory of 
the road. 
The system continued to expand through 
the early 1890s. Like many other roads, the 
Santa Fe had difficulty weathering the de-
pressed economy of the period and succumbed 
to receivership in 1893.11 One historian of the 
Santa Fe suggests that the financial condition 
of the company deteriorated in part because of 
the aggressive acquisition in 1890 of both the 
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St. Louis and San Francisco (the Frisco) and 
the Colorado and Midland railroads. When the 
road emerged from receivership in 1895, it no 
longer controlled these lines. Financial control 
of the fIrm had passed by this time into the 
hands of eastern fInancial interests.12 
The Santa Fe had developed the Atlantic 
and PacifIc Railroad (the A and P) in coopera-
tion with the Frisco after signing the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1879.13 This jointly controlled 
and operated line ran from Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, to Needles, California. The A and P 
played an important role in the transconti-
nental plans of both proprietary roads and may 
have represented a reasonable solution to the 
high construction and operating costs and the 
low traffIc potential of the territory traversed. 
The Santa Fe's acquisition of the Frisco also 
brought the A and P under the sole control of 
the Santa Fe. Although the Frisco system 
proved too large to digest, the A and P fIt 
nicely into the interterritorial growth schemes 
of the Santa Fe's management and was retained 
in the newly reconstituted system of 1895. 
The struggle between the Southern PacifIc 
and the Santa Fe for the traffic of the South-
west has been recounted elsewhere.14 The sub-
sequent development of Santa Fe lines into Los 
Angeles, San Diego, and the San Francisco Bay 
area resulted from the unwillingness of the 
Southern PacifIc to cooperate with the Santa 
Fe in the matter of through routes and a divi-
sion of traffic accommodating to the latter 
fum. The actions of the Southern PacifIc are 
perhaps understandable, as the railroad stood 
to lose considerable revenue by interchanging 
with the Santa Fe at Barstow, California, rather 
than at a junction in New Mexico or even at El 
Paso. To generate long-haul traffic and the 
desperately needed through routes, the Santa 
Fe was forced to develop its own lines to the 
major urban centers of California. 
Like the Burlington with its line from chi-
cago to Minneapolis, several Santa Fe lines in 
California crossed the most physically direct 
routes between their terminals. The Santa Fe 
also constructed a line that minimized the dis-
tance from Kansas City to Chicago. It was built 
in the late 1880s to improve the railway'S 
interterritorial competitiveness to Chicago and 
beyond. The Santa Fe connected at Kansas 
City with several roads, among them the Bur-
lington, the Milwaukee Road, the Missouri 
PacifIc, and the Rock Island. None of these 
lines provided connections with points beyond 
Chicago; thus, further transfers and divisions 
of rates were required on eastbound shipments 
and passenger traffic. The Santa Fe deter-
mined to increase the length of its haul by 
building its own line to Chicago. The new track 
was built to the highest specifIcations, and 
when completed, the Santa Fe provided the 
fastest service available from Kansas City to 
Chicago. IS Because this line was intended to 
serve through traffIc only, no diversions of the 
tracks to nearby local traffIc markets were 
made. 
In the years prior to 1900, the Santa Fe also 
expanded in two additional markets for inter-
territorial reasons. The Denver extension 
enabled the system to compete for traffic on a 
major through route, while the acquisition of 
the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe brought 
traffic from major Texas cities over the tracks 
of the Santa Fe and into the Middle West. 
By 1915 the Santa Fe had further consoli-
dated its position in Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Colorado. These areas remained natural terri-
tories of the road, while the system came to 
depend on long-haul and through traffIc for 
profIts. Major construction projects after 1900 
included improvements on the main line to the 
PacifIc and connections between the Gulf of 
Mexico and the main line near the Texas-New 
Mexico border. The system continued to ex-
pand into new markets in California, the Phoe-
nix region, and eastern Texas. 
THE CANADIAN PACIFIC SYSTEM 
Unlike the Burlington, the Canadian North-
ern or the Santa Fe, the Canadian PacifIc Rail-
way was conceived as a political plaything of 
Conservative national policy under Canada's 
prime minister, John A. McDonald, during the 
1870s and 1880s. The road had its origins in 
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the compact from which the Dominion of 
Canada emerged. That political agreement re-
quired the consolidation of the new federation 
through a continental spine of steel rails. The 
mission of the Canadian Pacific was transcon-
tinental in nature from the outset, and this 
railroad is an example of a system that never 
enjoyed a period of city-hinterland symbiosis 
as so many nineteenth-century North Ameri-
can railroads did (Fig. 2).16 
The Canadian Pacific syndicate intended to 
build its road without recourse to the sale of 
equity securities. Together with personal invest-
ments by syndicate members, the subsidies of 
land and cash from the dominion government 
were deemed sufficient to construct the line. 
Unfortunately, because of a number of eco-
nomic, political, and environmental circum-
stances, the original developmental strategy ran 
into difficulty. With further federal aid, and the 
sale of some equity securities and additional 
debt issues, construction of the skeletal net-
work was completed in 1885. 
Through acquisition the Canadian Pacific 
gained control of a number of short lines in 
Manitoba as well as considerable mileage in 
eastern Canada. Following completion of the 
transcontinental line, the railway adopted a 
territorial development policy aimed at pro-
ducing local traffic to support the high fixed 
costs of the lengthy system. Of particular con-
cern after 1885 were the physical geography of 
the Upper Great Lakes region and the sover-
eignty of the Dominion over the trade and 
economic relations of its territory. 
As the only railway operating a trunk system 
in the Canadian West, the Canadian Pacific had 
both a political and a strategic obligation to 
build additional lines to speed the colonization 
and agricultural growth of the prairies. This it 
did by constructing a network of east-west lines 
in Manitoba and the territories, with a few 
north-south connections and taproot lines 
northward into the Canadian wilderness. Con-
struction in the rapidly growing province of 
Manitoba often provided quick returns in local 
traffic, and the system as a whole was generally 
profitable in this period. Many of these feeders 
served an additional strategic function by 
siphoning off the traffic of the international 
boundary area and by rendering potential inva-
sions by American railroads less remunerative. 
A competitor, the Northern Pacific, arranged 
for construction of a line to Winnipeg with the 
cooperation of the provincial government of 
Manitoba, but interterritorial competition of 
the type so common south of the border did 
not occur in western Canada, for the most part, 
until after 1900. 
Another matter of great concern to Cana-
dian Pacific management was the main line 
north of Lake Superior. Constructed as re-
quired by the original contract, the track had 
strategic uses in the event of a disruption in 
American-Canadian relations. In the normal 
course of business, however, the greater length 
of this route and the economic sterility of the 
territory traversed lessened the prospects of 
profitable operation over this stretch of track. 
The Canadian Pacific therefore determined to 
gain control of its own line south of Lake 
Superior. Such a road would yield not only a 
shorter route to eastern Canada, but also poten-
tially greater local traffic, while enabling the 
company to serve additional Great Lakes ports. 
By 1890 the Canadian Pacific had come into 
control of four roads in this area: the Minnea-
polis and Pacific; the Minnesota, Sault Ste. 
Marie, and Atlantic; the Minneapolis and St. 
Croix; and the trackless Aberdeen, Bismarck, 
and Northwestern. These roads were reorgan-
ized as the Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Sault Ste. 
Marie (the Soo Line). The Canadian Pacific 
also gained control of the Duluth, South Shore, 
and Atlantic during this period. These lines, 
together with a connection built under ex-
tremely competitive conditions from Sudbury, 
Ontario, to Sault Ste. Marie, gave the Canadian 
Pacific its own line through the United States 
south of Lake Superior.17 
In the fifteen years following 1900, the 
Canadian Pacific became engaged in a territorial 
battle with two new Canadian transcontinental 
lines. The railway had to combat incursions 
from south of the border as well. For political 
reasons that made little economic sense, the 
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dominion government commissioned the con-
struction of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the 
Canadian Northern.18 What followed was a 
major interterritorial confrontation in which 
the Canadian Pacific was successful in retaining 
a significant share of its former near monopoly 
of the local traffic of the Canadian West. Num-
erous east-west lines were built on the Canadian 
prairies in an almost senseless competitive at-
mosphere in which operational factors were 
considered only too late if at all. 
The Canadian Pacific also extended its terri-
torial dominance over southern British Colum-
bia. Although unable to keep its rivals out of 
some of the more easily traveled passes through 
the Rockies, the railway forced its competitors 
to build more expensive lines to the Pacific. 
By 1915 the Canadian Pacific was in a strong 
position on the Canadian prairies. Not only did 
the firm hold impressive through routes to the 
East and to the West, but it controlled a signifi-
cant share of the local traffic in some of the 
richest ranching and agricultural districts of the 
Prairie Provinces. 
SEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The four North American railroad systems 
examined here showed certain similarities in 
their development. In their early years, three 
of the systems underwent a phase of city-
hinterland symbiosis in which their interests 
were closely identified with those of the major 
terminus. The Burlington was linked to Chicago, 
the Canadian Northern with Winnipeg, and the 
Santa Fe with Topeka and later with Atchison. 
Only the Canadian Pacific, with its truly con-
tinental mandate, never experienced this form 
of territorial development. All four roads 
sought the development of exclusive local 
traffic domains, and each was successful in 
meeting this long-range objective in the years 
prior to 1915. Each system engaged in one or 
more forms of interterritorial competition; 
indeed, in some years much of the construction 
activity on the Santa Fe and the Canadian 
Northern falls into this category of territorial 
development. 
The four railroads generally pursued devel-
opmental managerial strategies at the corporate 
level, especially the Canadian Pacific and the 
Canadian Northern. Indeed, the Canadian 
Northern fell victim to the extreme zeal of its 
rapid development. The Santa Fe followed a 
more opportunistic course in some merger and 
acquisition activities, while engaging in long-
term developmental investment policy in sys-
tematically improving its strategic position on 
the central Great Plains and financing its trans-
continental expansion from this profitable local 
base. The Burlington also engaged in a generally 
developmental management strategy, although 
the construction and acquisition of major inter-
urban lines linking Kansas City, Saint Louis and 
Minneapolis-Saint Paul with Chicago, and its 
acquisition of the Colorado and Southern, had 
opportunistic undertones. On other parts of its 
system, especially prior to 1880, a develop-
mental management policy was the order of the 
day. Likewise, these four systems all pursued 
similar objectives in developing local traffic 
bases from which to subsidize aggressive mar-
keting tactics for through traffic over wholly or 
partly owned routes. 
Differences among the four systems can be 
seen in the role of institutional factors, in the 
geography of capital flows, and in the location 
of management. In the institutional settings in 
which each road developed, decisions were 
made on the basis of both state or provincial 
and national policies. While the American poli-
tical landscape was more favorable to railroads 
prior to 1875, the Canadian situation seems to 
have improved after that date. Canadian politi-
cal positions were subject to more short-term 
fluctuation, however, than was the case south 
of the border. Both American railroads received 
substantial land grants in areas that later devel-
oped into their natural (integral) territories. 
The Canadian roads also received land grants, 
and in addition, the Canadian Northern was 
granted important concessions in the form of 
provincial bond guarantees by Manitoba and 
later other provincial governments. In both the 
United States and Canada, agrarian protest 
at the local and regional levels stimulated 
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lawmakers to establish federal and state or pro-
vincial agencies to oversee rates, tariffs, and 
general levels of profits from railroad business, 
although Canada lagged some twenty years be-
hind the United States in these developments. 
Significant differences among the four rail-
roads are also apparent in the location of the 
original capital for each line and in the history 
of corporate control. In the case of the Bur-
lington, control of the original short lines in 
TABLE 1 
THE HYPOTHESIZED SEQUENTIAL EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY OF 
NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATE RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Stage 
1. City· 
Hinterland 
Symbiosis 
2. Territorial 
Development 
3. Interterritorial 
Competition 
Diagram 
Finance and 
Organization 
Local control, 
developmental 
investment 
Shift to nonlocal 
control, generally 
developmental 
investment 
Nonlocal ownership, 
occasional 
opportunistic 
investment, 
separation of 
fmancial from 
operational control 
Territorial 
Policy 
Symbiotic 
development of 
local area 
Integral 
territory, 
identification 
with a region 
Maintenance and 
expansion of 
integral territory, 
development of 
through routes 
Traffic 
Development 
Strategy 
Local traffic 
Lo cal traffic, 
organization of 
through routes 
Through traffic, 
maintenance of 
local traffic 
preserves 
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Illinois remained in the hands of local investors 
for only a short time, falling into the fIrm grasp 
of a group of astute Boston capitalists even 
before 1860. The Santa Fe remained under the 
control of regional investors somewhat longer, 
but by the 1880s, large New York based inter-
ests were in command of the fInancial and 
operational fortunes of the road. Both Cana-
dian systems fared somewhat differently. The 
Canadian Northern gained control of several 
locally based Manitoba lines at the outset but 
remained under its eastern Canada based lead-
ers, MacKenzie and Mann, until its demise. The 
debt securities of the fIrm were largely in the 
hands of British investors, as these provincially 
guaranteed bonds appeared extremely safe to 
the investing public. The Canadian PacifIc was 
originally controlled by capitalists based in 
Montreal, but control gradually gravitated 
across the Atlantic, helped in part by the return 
to London of several original principals in the 
company. 
Generalizations from the developmental his-
tory of these four Great Plains railroads prior 
to 1915 can be combined in a hypothetical 
sequence of development that incorporates 
general trends but allows for dissimilarities in 
the evolution of corporate railway systems. 
Table 1 shows a proposed sequence of three 
stages: from city-hinterland symbiosis, through 
territorial development, to interterritorial com-
petition. 19 This sequence of development cor-
responds in general terms to changes in fInan-
cial and organizational structure, territorial 
policy, and traffIc development strategy on the 
part of a railroad corporation. The proposed 
sequence is highly generalized: any company 
might skip a stage; show manifestations of more 
than one stage on portions of its system at any 
particular time; or show minor deviations in 
the timing of transitions from local to nonlocal 
control, developmental and opportunistic man-
agement or investment strategies, territorial 
development policies, or local and through 
traffic objectives. This hypothetical sequence of 
nineteenth-century North American corporate 
railroad development strategies, however, ap-
pears to have applications in understanding the 
growth of corporate railroad systems through-
out the nineteenth century in the United States 
and Canada. Closer examination of primary 
documents will undoubtedly lead to further re-
fInements, but viewed from a broad, continent-
wide perspective, this hypothetical development 
sequence should help scholars and railroad 
enthusiasts alike to understand better the 
process through which the contemporary rail-
road map of North America was created. 
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